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[Excerpt] In the United States, proposals have been periodically introduced into Congress to amend the 
provisions of the Fair Labour Standards Act (FLSA) to restrict the use of overtime hours and stimulate 
employment growth. This report summarizes the research I have conducted since 1970 on the likely 
effects of these proposed policy changes and my appraisal of their desirability. Although all of the 
empirical results I discuss pertain to United States data, they suggest the type of empirical analyses that 
should be undertaken with Canadian data before decisions about policy changes are made here. 
I begin in the first main section with a brief history of hours of work legislation in the United States that 
includes a conceptual framework that I have found useful in analyzing proposed changes in hours 
legislation. The variety of empirical analyses I have undertaken that pertain to the wisdom of raising the 
overtime premium are discussed in the second section. My analyses of proposals to require employee 
consent prior to the working of overtime are discussed in the third section. The paper ends with some 
brief concluding remarks. 
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ON OVERTIME HOURS LEGISLATION 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, proposals have been periodically 
introduced into Congress to amend the provisions of the Fair 
Labour Standards Act (FLSA) to restrict the use of overtime 
hours and stimulate employment growth. This report 
summarizes the research I have conducted since 1970 on the 
likely effects of these proposed policy changes and my 
appraisal of their desirability.1 Although all of the 
empirical results I discuss pertain to United States data, 
they suggest the type of empirical analyses that should be 
undertaken with Canadian data before decisions about policy 
changes are made here. 
I begin in the first main section with a brief history 
of hours of work legislation in the United States that 
includes a conceptual framework that I have found useful in 
analyzing proposed changes in hours legislation. The variety 
of empirical analyses I have undertaken that pertain to the 
wisdom of raising the overtime premium are discussed in the 
second section. My analyses of proposals to require employee 
consent prior to the working of overtime are discussed in the 
third section. The paper ends with some brief concluding 
remarks. 
HOURS OF WORK LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
The overtime pay premium provisions of the Fair Labour 
Standards Act (FLSA) currently regulate only two dimensions 
of the hours of work relationship' — the number of hours 
after which the overtime premium goes into effect (forty) and 
the premium level (time and a half). Several European 
countries and Ontario regulate other dimensions in their 
legislation: for example, they require either prior 
governmental approval for overtime or employees to give their 
consent to working overtime, or both. A bill to amend the 
FLSA introduced into Congress in 1979 by Representative 
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Conyers would similarly have prohibited the mandatory 
assignment of overtime in the United States, as well as 
raised the overtime premium from time and a half to double 
time and required premium pay after 3 5 rather than 40 hours. 
To introduce the analytic framework that I believe is useful 
in thinking about such a proposal, or similar ones for 
Canada, I begin with a brief summary of the history of hours 
of work legislation in the United States. 
The earliest forms of hours of work legislation in the 
United States were initiated at the state level, applied to 
women and children, and had the aim of reducing fatigue and 
exhaustion (Commons and Andrews 1920; Paulsen 1959; Phelps 
1939). For example, in 1879 legislation regulating maximum 
hours of work was introduced in Massachusetts, where its 
supporters claimed that long workweeks were exhausting and 
caused women to age prematurely (Cahill 1932, pp. 106-107). 
The first hours laws covering men in the private sector were 
also at the state level and covered occupations in which long 
workweeks adversely affected third parties or employees 
themselves. For example, legislation in 1890 in Ohio limited 
the hours of train operators in the hope that this would 
reduce railroad accidents and protect the travelling public. 
This law was quickly followed by state laws limiting the 
workweek of miners, who were subject to unhealthy and unsafe 
working conditions (Paulsen 1959, p. 114). 
In each of these cases a rationale (from the perspective 
of an analytical labour economist) for the protective labour 
legislation is found in the fact that the marginal social 
cost of longer workweeks exceeded the marginal private cost 
to employers. In the absence of government intervention 
these divergences persisted for a variety of reasons: low 
family income levels did not permit many women and children 
the luxury of turning down jobs with long hours; no good 
alternatives to the railroads existed for long-range travel 
and railroad passengers were not always accurately informed 
about railroad employees workweeks; and the limited 
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alternative employment opportunities in mining communities 
often restricted the occupational choice of individuals in 
those areas. In each case, then, markets failed, in the 
sense that compensating wage, or price, differentials did not 
arise to compensate employees, or third parties, for the full 
risks they incurred because of long hours of work. The case 
for government intervention was strong; the only real 
question is why the legislation took the form or outright 
restrictions on hours rather than the use of tax or penalty 
schemes to increase employers' marginal private cost of 
longer hours. 
At the federal level, throughout the early 19 3 0s, bills 
were repeatedly introduced into Congress to limit the length 
of the workweek. While the goal of protecting existing 
employees from the ills associated with excessive fatigue 
remained, a second explicit purpose of such legislation was 
to___ increase employment by spreading the available work. 
Ultimately on June 25, 1938, the Fair Labour Standards Act, 
with its overtime provisions, was enacted. 
Once again, the provisions of the Act can be 
rationalized in terms of the divergence between private and 
social costs. Even if employers and their employees in the 
193 0s were satisfied with long workweeks, their private 
calculations ignored the social costsborne by the 
unemployed. The time and a half rate for overtime can be 
thought of as a tax to make employers bear the full marginal 
social cost of their hours decisions; it was meant to reduce 
the use of overtime hours and to stimulate employment, at 
least to the 'nix"tent~"'"that the increased costs do not 
substantially reduce total person-hours demanded. 
Furthermore, if employees were not satisfied with long 
workweeks during the 193 0s but, because of market 
imperfections, they did not have the freedom to choose 
employment with employers who offered shorter workweeks, the 
direct payment of the tax to employees who worked longer 
3 
workweeks can be justified as an attempt to remedy this 
imperfection. 
ON THE WISDOM OP RAISING THE OVERTIME PREMIUM 
Although coverage under the overtime pay provisions of the 
FLSA has increased substantially over the last half century, 
the premium itself has remained constant at time and a half. 
Periodically, as in the Conyers bill, proposals have been 
introduced in Congress to raise the premium to double time. 
The underlying argument made to support the increase is that 
while unemployment remains a pressing national problem, the 
use of overtime hours has increased. Moreover, since the 
enactment of the FLSA, the deterrent effect of the overtime 
premium on the use of overtime has been weakened by the 
growing share of hiring and training costs, fringe benefits, 
and government-mandated insurance premiums in total 
compensation. Many of these costs are quasi-fixed or 
employee-related (e.g., vacation pay, holiday pay, sick 
leave, hiring costs), rather than hours related, in the sense 
that they do not vary with overtime hours. An increase in 
these quasi-fixed costs reduces employers' marginal costs of 
working their employees overtime, relative to their costs of 
hiring additional employees. The growth of these costs, it 
is claimed, has been at least partially responsible for the 
; increase in overtime and therefore an increase in the 
overtime premium paid by employers is required to offset this 
adverse effect. 
A complete analysis of the desirability of raising the 
overtime premium requires answers to a number of empirical 
questions. Would higher overtime pay rates relative to the 
quasi-fixed costs of employment induce employers to reduce 
their usage of overtime hours? Would reductions in overtime 
hours be "converted" to full-time jobs or "lost" to capital 
substitution or output reductions? Would employers comply 
with the legislation? Would workers who previously worked 
overtime, moonlight at second jobs and reduce the employment 
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opportunities for unemployed individuals? Would the 
unemployed have the skills necessary to fill any new jobs 
that might be created? Finally, what would be the income 
distribution consequences of the proposed policy change? 
Empirical analyses directed at answering all of these 
questions, and others, are summarized below. 
My own research and that of others has demonstrated 
that, across establishments in the United States, a strong \ 
positive relationship exists between the use of overtime 
hours and the ratio of weekly nonwage labour costs per j 
employee to the overtime wage rate (Ehrenberg and Schumann 
1982a, Ch. 2) . This implies that increasing the overtime ) 
premium to double time would substantially reduce the average ; 
use of overtime hours, perhaps by as much as 2 0 per cent, on I 
average, if compliance with the legislation did not change 
and if straight-time wage rates were not affected. Moreover, 
to the extent that the reduction in hours could be converted 
into new full-time employment, such a change in the 
legislation has the'potential to increase the employment of 
workers subject to the overtime provisions by perhaps 1 or 2 
per cent. It must be stressed that in the United States less 
than 60 per cent of the workforce is subject to the overtime i 
pay provisions, due to many industry, occupation, and size I 
class exemptions that exist. So the potential to increase 
the overall employment level is somewhat less. 
Whether such increases in employment would actually 
occur and whether the new jobs would go to currently 
nonemployed individuals is another matter. These estimates 
are predicated on a number of assumptions; if any fail to 
hold the actual employment gains would be reduced. 
First, the maximum employment gain estimates assume that 
the demand for labour is completely inelastic so that a wage 
increase does not lead to any reduction in employment. Thus \ 
any reduction in overtime hours would be converted into new \ 
jobs. An increase in the overtime premium, however, does i 
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raise the average cost per person-hour of labour; this should 
bring about a shift toward more capital-intensive means of 
production and, to the extent that the cost increase is 
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, to a 
reduction in output. Both effects should lead to a decline 
in the number of person-hours demanded by employers. 
Simulations we did based on previous estimates of the wage 
elasticity of demand for labour (see Hamermesh 198 6) suggest 
that this factor should cause the estimate of the number of 
new jobs created to fall by 0.25 percentage points (Ehrenberg 
and Schumann 1982a, Ch. 3). 
Second, the estimated employment effects assume that all 
the new jobs created would go to individuals who were 
unemployed. This ignores the possibility of increased 
moonlighting by currently employed workers whose overtime is 
restricted. If this occurred, the actual employment gains 
would be reduced. Our simulations based on previous studies 
of moonlighting decisions (Shishko and Rostker 1976) suggest, 
however, that increased moonlighting would not significantly 
restrict the number of newly created jobs that would go to 
the unemployed (Ehrenberg and Schumann (1982a, Ch. 3). 
Third, the employment gain estimates assume that 
indivisibilities in production processes will not prevent any 
reduction in overtime hours from being converted to new full-
time jobs. For example, while large establishments may have 
the option of substituting one new full-time employee for the 
overtime hours of twenty employees who each work two overtime 
hours a week, small establishments with only a few employees 
working overtime may not enjoy such options. If such 
constraints existed, one might contemplate exempting small 
establishments from any increase in the overtime premium; 
this would reduce the estimated employment gain associated 
with an increase in the premium. The only study using U.S. 
data that looked at the issue, however, found no systematic 
relationship between establishment size and the existence of 
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a trade-off between overtime hours and employment (Ehrenberg 
1971a). 
Fourth, these estimates assume that an increase in the 
overtime premium will not lead to compensating adjustments in 
straight-time wages or fringe benefits. Suppose, however, 
that firms and their employees were initially in an 
equilibrium situation in which overtime hours were regularly 
scheduled. One plausible response to a legislated increase 
in the premium is for them to voluntarily agree to a 
reduction in the level of straight-time wages, or fringes, or 
both, leaving total compensation for the initial number of 
hours unchanged. If this occurred, it may be argued that 
neither side would have an incentive to reduce the usage of 
overtime (the legislation would have had no effect on the 
employer's total costs or on the employee's total 
compensation for the given number of hours) and the resulting 
employment gain would be reduced. While I have not obtained 
any evidence on the probability that such compensating wage 
or fringe benefit differentials would arise, at least one 
previous study has found that increases in the minimum wage 
sometimes lead to compensating reductions in fringe benefits 
(Wessels 1980). Thus, this possibility should not be 
dismissed out of hand. 
Fifth, these estimates assume either that the skill 
distributions of those working overtime and those who are 
unemployed are sufficiently similar that bottlenecks will not 
arise, or that the elasticity of substitution between the 
unemployed and those working overtime is very high. Put 
another way, they assume either that there will always be 
unemployed workers available to fill the newly created 
positions or that the occupations that the unemployed are in 
easily can be substituted for the occupations of those 
working overtime. 
In fact, analyses we have conducted of the distribution 
of the experienced unemployed by skill class and geographic 
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area, and the similar distribution for those working 
overtime, using data from the May 1978 Current Population 
Survey (CPS), suggest that bottlenecks may well arise 
(Ehrenberg and Schumann 1982a, Ch. 4). Indeed, the data 
suggest that at least 8.5 per cent of all the newly created 
jobs would go unfilled for want of workers with the required 
skills residing in the same geographic area. This estimate 
is subject to a number of qualifications, however, and the 
importance of the skill bottleneck problem will depend on 
which stage of the business cycle the economy is in. In 
periods of higher unemployment, when less overtime is worked, 
skill mismatches would be less of a problem. 
Moreover, our previous analyses ignored the question of 
the substitutability of overtime hours, in occupations in 
which overtime is worked, for new employment, in occupations 
in which the experienced unemployed "reside". Hamermesh 
(1986) provides estimates of substitution across skill 
categories of labour that should prove useful in this regard 
and his report in this volume addresses this issue in more 
detail. 
Finally, the maximum employment gain estimates assume 
both that the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA are fully 
complied with, and that an increase in the overtime premium 
would not reduce the compliance rate. In fact, analyses of 
the May 1978 CPS data and the 1977 Michigan Quality of 
Employment Survey (QES) data suggest that at least 10 to 2 0 
per cent of the employees working overtime who should legally 
receive a premium of time and a half for overtime fail to 
receive it. If the noncompliance rate were to remain 
constant in response to an increase in the premium to double 
time and employers continued to pay these employees the same 
premium, employers usage of overtime hours would not change, 
and the estimated employment gain estimates would be reduced 
by 10 to 20 per cent (Ehrenberg and Schumann 1982a, Ch. 5; 
1982b). 
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Taken together, these factors suggest that the: 
employment gain associated with an increase in the overtime:; 
premium is likely to be considerably less than the maximumj. 
estimates reported above. Furthermore, analysis of the ;  
income distributional consequences of the legislation that we 
conducted suggests that middle-income and upper-income 
families would gain more from an increase in the overtime 
premium than would lower income families (Ehrenberg and 
Schumann (1982a, Ch. 6) . More specifically, an analysis of 
the May 1978 CPS data suggested that overtime earnings per 
family increase with family income, and that the net effect 
of an increase in the overtime premium (taking account of the 
increased premium rate, the decreased overtime hours, and the 
increased employment) would be to increase average family , 
income more for middle-income and upper-income families than f 
it would for lower-income families. When the inflationary i 
consequences of the legislation are added in, the case for ! 
increasing the overtime premium to double time is | 
substantially weakened.2 
On the basis of the evidence I have summarized above, 
Schumann and I concluded that raising the overtime premium 
would not be an effective way of stimulating growth, even 
though it would lead to a reduction in overtime hours. 
Moreover, it would not have desirable income distribution 
consequences (Ehrenberg and Schumann 1982a). 
Raising the overtime premium paid by employers might 
make sense for another reason, however, if the revenue that 
would accrue from such an increase was not distributed to 
employees in the form of higher premium pay received by them 
for overtime. Instead, the revenue from any increase in the 
tax on overtime would go directly to aid the unemployed; for 
example it could be contributed to unemployment insurance 
funds or to employment and training program budgets. Unless 
it can be demonstrated that market imperfections prevent 
currently employed workers from freely choosing the length of 
their workweeks and that the existing overtime premium does 
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not fully compensate these workers for the disutility 
associated with long workweeks, then no increase in the 
premium paid to employees is justified. One can thus 
logically be in favor of raising the tax paid by employers 
when they use overtime hours but not in favor of raising the 
overtime premium paid to employees. In fact, a proponent of 
such a proposal in the United States historically has been 
the United Automobile Workers.3 
ON THE WISDOM OF REQUIRING EMPLOYEE CONSENT FOR OVERTIME 
HOURS 
What about the Conyers proposal to legislate the prohibition 
of mandatory overtime, as is done in several European 
countries? Presumably such a proposal can be viewed as being 
based upon the belief that market imperfections persist in 
the labour market and that the overtime premium does not 
fully compensate employees for the disutility associated with 
mandatory overtime. One may question, however, whether 
markets have failed here. There appear to be a variety of 
overtime hours provisions offered in the U.S. labour market. 
For example, only 16 per cent of the respondents in the 1977 
Michigan Quality of Employment Survey (QES) who reported 
working overtime also reported that the overtime hours 
decision was made unilaterally by their employer and that 
overtime was mandatory in the sense that employees who 
refused it suffered a penalty (Quinn and Staines 1979, pp. 
90-91) . In addition, roughly 20 per cent of employees 
covered by major collective bargaining agreements in 1976 had 
explicit provisions in their contracts that gave them the 
right to refuse overtime (U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics 
1979) . 
To the extent that labour markets are competitive and 
establishments do offer a variety of overtime hours 
provisions (e.g., employer determines, employee determines, 
penalty for refusal), compensating wage differentials should 
arise. That is, to attract labour, establishments that 
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offered distasteful mandatory overtime provisions would have 
to pay higher straight-time wages, higher overtime premiums, 
or higher fringe benefits than establishments in which such 
provisions did not occur. If fully compensating wage 
differentials exist, there is no case for legislative 
prohibitions against mandatory overtime. Evidence on the 
extent is of importance to policy makers. 
In fact, our empirical study of the subject for the 
United States, using the QES data, found that, on average, 
such compensating differentials did not exist (Ehrenberg and 
Schumann 1982a, 1984). This finding provides some support in 
favor of a prohibition of mandatory overtime, although the 
benefits from such legislation would have to be weighed 
against the potential costs; the latter include reduced 
employer flexibility in scheduling production, and thus, 
increased production costs, which would lead in turn to lower 
employment levels. The study also found, however, that 
compensating differentials did exist for union members. That 
is, unions were able to win for their members through the 
collective bargaining process what the market on average did 
not produce.4 The workers most "in need" of the prohibition 
on mandatory overtime in the United States appear then to be 
nonunion workers. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The discussion above summarizes what I believe prior 
empirical research in the United States has told us about the 
wisdom of either raising the overtime premium or prohibiting 
assignment of overtime without employee consent in the United 
States. While empirical estimates for one country may be 
useful as a starting point for discussing policy in another 
country, given differing institutional arrangements or 
behavioral relationships between countries, they should be 
used only as a starting point. In a sense, this report may 
best be viewed as indicating the types of research that 
should be undertaken using Canadian data. 
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One proposal that I have not addressed directly is to 
reduce the standard workweek; Robert Hart discusses European 
analysis of this issue in his report in this volume. 
Variations in standard workweeks in U.S. data are very small 
so no prior analysis of them has been undertaken. However, 
one can conceptualize such a proposal in a very similar 
manner to that of raising the overtime premium. 
For example, a requirement in, say, the U.S. that 
employers pay time and a half after the first thirty-five 
hours per week, would increase the average hourly wage cost 
of the first forty hours per employee by 6.25 per cent. If 
the requirement were for double time, the average hourly wage 
for the first forty hours would increase by 12.5 per cent. 
In either case, employers would reduce the total person-hours 
they demand, and this would limit the positive employment 
effects of the legislated change. 
Similarly, converting the hours between thirty-six and 
forty into overtime hours would increase employers' 
incentives not to comply with the legislation and lead to 
possible compensating decreases in straight-time wages and 
fringes. Both these changes would reduce employers' 
incentives to substitute increased employment for overtime 
hours. Finally, one would again have to consider the 
possibility that skill mismatches between the unemployed and 
the new jobs that were created would constrain the employment 
effects of the change in the legislation. Of course, since 
this amendment would apply to all covered full-time workers, 
not solely those working more than forty hours, it is less 
likely that skill mismatches would be a problem in this case. 
Put another way, the skill mix of all covered full-time 




1. My research has been reported in Ehrenberg 1971a, 1971b, 
1971c and Ehrenberg and Schumann 1981, 1982a, 1982b, 
1984. This report draws heavily from that material. 
2. In Ehrenberg and Schumann (1982a, Ch. 3), we calculated 
that an increase in the overtime premium to double time 
might increase average hourly costs by 0.8 per cent for 
workers covered by the legislation. 
3. A similar proposal was offered in U.S. Department of 
Labour (19 67) by Howard Young who favoured both raising 
the overtime premium to double time and instituting an 
additional surtax on overtime that would be paid by the 
employer directly into a social welfare fund. Young was 
a special consultant to the president of the UAW at the 
time. More recently, this position was supported by 
Kenneth Meyers, a regional director of the UAW in his 
testimony on the Conyers bill (see U.S. House of 
Representatives 1980). 
If one is concerned that such a proposal will increase 
employers' costs, one can offer them marginal employment 
tax credits equal to the amount of their increased costs 
for expanding employment. This would provide a further 
incentive to them to increase employment. 
4. The finding that unionized workers receive compensating 
wage differentials for unfavorable job characteristics, 
while nonunion workers often do not, is not unique to 
the mandatory overtime issue. 
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